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Normally screws are so cheap and small and simple 
you think of them as unimportant.  But now, as your 
Quality awareness becomes stronger, you realize 
that this one, individual, particular screw is neither 
cheap nor small nor unimportant.  Right now this 
screw is worth exactly the selling price of the whole 
motorcycle, because the motorcycle is actually 
valueless until you get the screw out. 
With this reevaluation of the screw comes a 
willingness to expand your knowledge of it.1 
INTRODUCTION 
A tacit assumption often surfaces in intellectual property law: 
that a copyright holder (or for that matter any intellectual property 
owner) can capture only a fraction of the “intrinsic value” of a 
work.2  This view is consistent with the standard theory of 
incentives, according to which intellectual creation should be 
encouraged by allowing authors and inventors to “reap where they 
have sown.”3  Some have suggested that a copyright holder should 
collect (internalize) the entirety of the social or economic welfare 
associated with the work,4 in order to align private and social 
interests and thus allow the market to tend towards maximization 
of social welfare.5  Others have argued that many positive 
externalities cannot, and should not, be internalized.6  The debate 
 
 1 ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 286 (William 
Morrow & Co. 1974). 
 2 See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257, 281 (2007) (“[N]o one owner can capture the full value of . . . innovation. . . .”); 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (2005) (“Efforts to permit intellectual property owners to fully internalize the 
benefits of their creativity will inevitably get the balance wrong.”); Julie E. Cohen, 
Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (2000) (“Creators of . . . 
works cannot appropriate all of the value that they create.”). 
 3 RICHARD A. POSNER & WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003). 
 4 For a discussion of other aspects of the definition and the distinction between social 
welfare and economic welfare, see infra Part I. 
 5 See Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 
REV. L. & ECON. 649, 651 (2007). 
 6 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 259, 276–79. 
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turns upon which fraction of a work’s value should be captured as 
market value, but it appears that both sides assume that this 
fraction cannot exceed 100%, i.e., the totality of the intrinsic value. 
The assumption that total social welfare is a “natural limit” for 
the market price of a copyrighted work is problematic for two 
reasons.  The first argument is that negative externalities may 
allow a copyright owner to profit even as the world at large does 
not benefit from use of the work.  For example, the net social 
benefit created by a training manual for terrorists is likely 
negative,7 and yet someone might be willing to purchase or license 
the copyright in that manual.  In this example, the market price of 
the work (which is positive) exceeds its intrinsic value (which is 
negative).  At least part of this gap is due to negative externalities.  
To use a classic analogy, a property owner or business owner may 
profit from environmentally harming activities, since the negative 
externalities of pollution are never fully internalized; this makes 
environmental regulation necessary.8 
The second argument against limiting market price to a work’s 
intrinsic value has nothing to do with externalities, but is related to 
unconventional uses of intellectual property rights in the context of 
certain business strategies.  For example, an intellectual property 
owner who engages in a “hold-up” strategy is trying to leverage 
her bargaining advantage to extract a price that exceeds the fair 
value of the property.9  Likewise, a “lock-out” strategy seeks to use 
a piece of intellectual property as an “access code” to a product in 
order to exclude potential competitors.10  It is not difficult to show 
that in these and similar fact patterns, the strategic value of a work 
far exceeds whatever intrinsic value that work may have. 
Starting from these preliminary considerations, this Note 
argues that all strategic uses of copyright law, including hold-ups 
and lock-outs, are just examples of a mismatch between the 
intrinsic value of a work and its market value.  More importantly, it 
can be shown that all such strategies fall within a common 
 
 7 The reader who believes that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter may 
substitute a work of his or her choice. 
 8 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 1038. 
 9 See infra Part II(A). 
 10 See infra Part II(B)–(D). 
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spectrum with hold-up at one end and lock-out at the other.  While 
this may be true for intellectual property rights in general, 
copyright law offers some particularly compelling illustrations of 
the concept.  In all of these examples, a work with a relatively 
small intrinsic value is the key to a vault.  The only difference 
between hold-up and lock-out is whose money is in the vault.  In 
other words, whether any particular fact pattern falls closer to the 
lock-out or to the hold-up end of the spectrum depends on whether 
the purpose of the strategy is to protect one’s own investment (i.e., 
locking a competitor out) or appropriating someone else’s 
investment (i.e., holding a target up).  An intermediate situation is 
also possible, where both sides put some money into the vault but 
only one of them holds the key.  Viewed in this light, strategic uses 
of copyright protection are in clear tension with the overarching 
policies of copyright law, because they essentially reduce the work 
of authorship to a tool for achieving a purpose wholly unconnected 
to the nature of the work itself. 
A critical analysis of strategic uses of copyright can take at 
least two independent routes.  The first argument is of a legal 
nature: are strategic uses consistent with the constitutional and 
statutory scheme of federal intellectual property law?  The second 
argument is an equitable one: does enforcement of copyright for 
non-copyright-related purposes trigger the equitable doctrine of 
unclean hands, in its modern form of copyright misuse?  Even if 
neither argument prevails, it is worth asking those questions in 
order to bring out into the open an issue of great importance in the 
current regime of ever-strengthening copyright protection. 
To clarify, the issue is not whether hold-up and lock-out 
strategies are “right” or “wrong.”  To some extent, every 
intellectual property owner exercising her rights excludes others 
from using her work, i.e., locks them out, or demands payment for 
allowing them to use it, i.e., holds them up.  The terms “hold-up” 
and “lock-out” are used here as shorthand to denote litigation 
strategies that may be perfectly legitimate.  Inequitable uses of 
copyright law can and should be addressed by generally applicable 
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equitable doctrines, such as laches and estoppel.11  The purpose of 
this Note is to explore an equally interesting, and less studied, 
issue: to what extent copyright law is the right tool to safeguard an 
economic interest that is only tenuously associated with the value 
of the intellectual creation that the law purports to promote.  Put 
another way: is it desirable to let people use copyright law as a 
“toolbox” to create an ad-hoc protection for their economic 
interest, where that interest is already protected by other, more 
appropriate legal mechanisms?  From a practice standpoint, is it 
desirable that plaintiff’s counsel always assert copyright 
infringement, in addition to other intellectual property claims, in 
order to avoid committing malpractice? 
The rest of this Note proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews the 
basic economic definition of the intrinsic value of a work of 
authorship, and concludes that economic analysis is more useful 
for its insights than for its quantitative results.  Part II looks at 
specific examples of hold-up and lock-out strategies, showing that 
in each case the market price of the affected works exceeds 
whatever intrinsic value those works may have.  Part III discusses 
a unified model for strategic uses of copyright protection, and 
presents a pictorial representation of the “strategic space” on which 
litigants operate.  Part IV discusses whether strategic uses are 
compatible with copyright policies.  Conclusions are briefly drawn 
at the end of the Note. 
I. ECONOMIC DEFINITION OF THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF A WORK 
Law-and-economics literature provides a rigorous, clear-cut 
definition of the intrinsic value of a work of authorship, as the total 
economic welfare deriving from the work.12  Economic welfare 
may be defined as the sum of three terms: the consumer surplus 
(i.e., the difference between the price that consumers would be 
willing to pay and the market price they actually end up paying); 
 
 11 The ambiguous relationship between legal principles and equitable standards is 
further discussed in Part IV(B), infra, in the context of copyright misuse. 
 12 See WILLIAM FISHER, An Alternative Compensation System, in PROMISES TO KEEP: 
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 7–8 (2004), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf. 
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the copyright holder’s gross profits; and the profits obtained by 
third parties that sell unauthorized copies of the work.13  In order to 
determine the total economic welfare, one must first define a 
market for the goods or services embodying the work (e.g., copies 
of a book).14  Second, one must know the demand curve (i.e., how 
many copies of the work would be sold at a given price), as well as 
other quantities, such as the production costs.15  Finally, once the 
stage for market action is set, the copyright holder will select a 
price that maximizes her profits.16 
Apart from quantitative results, economic analysis provides a 
key intuition: The value of a work cannot be defined in a vacuum, 
and has meaning only in the context of a market, i.e., an audience.  
If, for example, the number of potential users of the work 
increases, more copies of the book will be sold, and the value of 
the underlying literary work will correspondingly increase.  Also, 
as an audience becomes more educated and sophisticated, it may 
better appreciate (and be willing to pay more) for intellectually 
challenging works.  Whatever value a work may have is not a 
static quantity, but changes with the receptivity of a market to it.  
This insight, however, should not be carried too far, as some works 
increase in value with time only because they develop into 
commercial franchises.17 
This Note borrows from economic theory the basic definition 
of the value of a work as the total social welfare associated with 
the work.  However, as elegant as economic theory is, it suffers 
from several shortcomings, which require a few drastic departures 
from the simplified framework conventionally adopted in law-and-
economics works.  The rest of this section is dedicated to a 
discussion of these caveats. 
First, to be of any use, economic analysis requires knowledge 
of parameters that are notoriously difficult to estimate.  For 
example, consumer surplus can only be computed from knowledge 
 
 13 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 339–40 (1989). 
 14 Id. at 333. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 336. 
 17 This point is further discussed in Part III, infra. 
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of the demand curve, which will provide the highest price that each 
potential consumer would be willing to pay for a copy of the work.  
This leads back to square one—the market price of the rights 
associated to the work, including of course any strategic effects.  
As with other law-and-economics analyses, a rigorous definition of 
the intrinsic value of a work based on microeconomics may be one 
of those “stimulating intellectual exercises that are often lacking in 
real-world relevance.”18  Assume, however, that the economic 
definition of the value of a work is at least useful as a theoretical 
tool.  This point will be examined at the end of this section. 
Second, it is assumed as a crude approximation that the 
intrinsic value of a work is independent of the extent of protection 
afforded by the law.  A fundamental insight from economic 
analysis is that the total economic welfare associated with any 
given work depends to some extent on the strength of the 
intellectual property rights associated with it, for example, by 
affecting the market price, cost of protection, and cost of 
infringement.19  In fact, one of the purposes of economic analysis 
is the identification of a legal regime that maximizes economic 
welfare.20  However, for the purposes of the following discussion, 
it is likely that such effects may be neglected to a first 
approximation.  Common sense suggests that, given some degree 
of public access to a work, its long-term social effect will not be 
greatly dependent on the exact nature of the rights granted to its 
author.  Moreover, millennia of pre-copyright literature indicate 
that, even in the total absence of legal protection, the creation of a 
work of authorship would have a significant net welfare impact.21  
Therefore, it is assumed that a work of authorship has a value 
independent of the degree of protection associated with it. 
Third, the subtle distinctions between the value of a work in 
itself and the market value of the rights in that work are neglected.  
 
 18 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law 
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 444 (1994). 
 19 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 336–37. 
 20 See id.; see also Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of 
Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 204–17 (2006). 
 21 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (1970). 
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Under federal copyright law, ownership attaches to the rights 
rather than to the work itself.22  The owner of a copyright has a 
number of rights that range from the very narrow (e.g., display 
right23) to the very broad (e.g., right of adaptation24).  Each of these 
rights has a market price, and one could imagine other, even 
stronger rights, such as the right to prevent people from speaking 
about a work at their dinner table.  The current copyright regime is 
“leaky,” in the sense that it purposely prevents excessive 
internalization.25  As an academic exercise, one might think that in 
some ideal limit of an author’s “absolute” rights, the fair market 
value of the work will be identical to the total welfare associated 
with the work.  In a more realistic legal framework, one should be 
able to recover less than that maximum amount; this is the “natural 
limit” assumption mentioned in Part I. 
Fourth, the economic approach assumes a simplified, closed 
system that does not account for externalities.  In other words, 
economic theory neglects the difference between economic welfare 
and social welfare.26  In the example in Part I, neglecting negative 
externalities leads to the conclusion that the terrorists’ training 
manual has a positive intrinsic value, since both consumer surplus 
and producer profit are positive.  Positive externalities may 
likewise distort market dynamics.  A book may make people think 
of new ideas and change society for the better, thus benefiting even 
people who have never even heard about the book in the first 
place.27  Professor Netanel has suggested that copyright protection 
may also promote democracy by providing incentives to creativity 
on one hand, and economic self-reliance (i.e., freedom from 
patronage) on the other.28  There are two ways to address the 
 
 22 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 23 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to . . . display the copyrighted work publicly”). 
 24 See id. (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to . . . 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
 25 Frischmann, supra note 5, at 653. 
 26 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1303 
(1994) (discussing the gap between objective indicators of economic welfare, such as 
gross national product, and social welfare, such as unemployment and povery rates). 
 27 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 268–71. 
 28 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 347–63 (1996). 
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problem of externalities in the economic analysis, neither of which 
is very satisfactory.  The first approach is to remove externalities 
by adopting new legal rules that force full internalization.29  This 
runs into a number of problems—many externalities cannot be 
fully internalized, due for example to transaction costs, and even 
where they can be, property rights may distort market mechanisms 
even more than externalities.30  The other option is to simply 
ignore externalities, and define the intrinsic value of a work based 
on whatever can be internalized under the current legal regime.  
This fails to account for both the fraction of consumer surplus that 
cannot be internalized by the producer (e.g., uses of a work falling 
under the fair use exception) and any broader effects that the 
consumers themselves cannot fully internalize (e.g., the social 
benefits of education). 
There is a general reason why the first four caveats are less 
important than one might think.  In fact, all the fine details of the 
definition of the intrinsic value of a work are mostly academic for 
purposes of the following discussion.  As the preceding discussion 
has shown, there are at least four ways in which one can define 
value: (1) total social welfare; (2) total economic welfare; (3) 
potential market value of the copyright owner’s rights under the 
hypothesis of “perfect” internalization; and (4) actual value of the 
rights in the current “leaky” copyright regime.  Common sense 
suggests that the total social welfare should be the highest of the 
four because it captures all possible uses by all possible users.  
Actual value of the rights should be the lowest because it only 
captures some particular uses by a particular class of users.  
However, the next section will try to show that there are many 
cases in which this idealized picture is turned on its head and 
copyright owners (even within a “leaky” system) manage to apply 
a market price that exceeds the total social welfare associated with 
a work.  In those situations, it does not really matter whether the 
intrinsic value is computed as the full social welfare or a fraction 
of it—the actual figure is irrelevant where in any case it is 
negligible as compared with the market value of the rights. 
 
 29 Frischmann, supra note 5, at 667. 
 30 Id. at 655, 671. 
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The last consideration leads to a final, and most important, 
caveat: The economic definition does not distinguish a work as 
such from other economic activities associated with it.  However, 
in a hold-up or lock-out situation, those other economic activities 
may be much more significant than the work itself.  What 
economics really defines is the welfare generated by a transaction, 
rather than just the literal object of that transaction.  A transaction 
that nominally involves only the licensing or sale of the intellectual 
property might really be about transferring some larger economic 
interest, where the intellectual property is the key to that interest.  
Hence, there is a fundamental disconnect between what a work is 
really worth and what consumers may be willing to pay for it. 
Where it is not easy to disentangle the economic value of a 
work from its market value, one should short-circuit economic 
theory and ask the direct question: how much social welfare the 
work as such creates, and not as part of some business strategy.  
One way to cut through the fog of economic theory is to perform a 
simple thought experiment: Imagine what would happen if the 
work under consideration was replaced with a different work of 
comparable intrinsic value.  For example, a novel could be 
replaced with another novel of a similar genre, literary quality, 
page count, etc.  If the situation remains substantially unchanged, 
one can infer that the transaction was about the work and not about 
something else.  If instead the substitution has a significant impact 
on the market value of the work, it is probably the case that the 
work was instrumental to a broader business strategy. 
II. CASE STUDIES: HOLD-UP AND LOCK-OUT 
The preceding section has shown that a top-down approach, 
starting from an ab initio economic definition of the intrinsic value 
of a work, is difficult at best, and possibly impracticable.  The rest 
of this Note will proceed instead in a bottom-up direction, starting 
from concrete examples with the ultimate purpose of identifying a 
few general principles.  Since in all these examples intellectual 
property rights are used strategically rather than to protect the 
underlying works, it is easy to show that the market value of the 
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rights exceeds whatever intrinsic value the works may have.  Two 
archetypal fact patterns will be considered: hold-up and lock-out. 
A. Hold-up 
Professors Lemley and Weiser define “hold-up” as a strategic 
use of litigation that takes advantage of the over-broad injunctive 
relief typically granted in intellectual property cases.31  Hold-up 
situations have received much attention in the patent field, and 
specifically with respect to the information technology industry, 
for two reasons.  First, certain technologies such as wireless 
telecommunications are covered by so many patents that it would 
be unthinkable for any manufacturer to obtain opinion of counsel 
with respect to each of them.32  As a result, many manufacturers 
have no choice but to take the chance of infringing someone else’s 
patent.  The second factor facilitating hold-up is that once 
infringement is discovered, the cost and delay associated with a 
design-around may often be unacceptable for the manufacturer.33  
As a result, patent owners can extract settlement payments far in 
excess of what the manufacturers would have paid to license the 
technology before designing the product.34  In other words, patent 
hold-up is a typical situation in which the market price of a 
technology exceeds its “intrinsic value.” 
Even though hold-up has mostly received attention in the 
context of patent rights, significant examples of such behavior can 
be found in the copyright arena.  In a first fact pattern, the user of a 
work is not aware of the fact that someone else’s copyright may be 
infringed.  This may happen, for example, where the original 
author of a work purports to assign all her rights to a publisher but 
years later the author, or her heirs, unexpectedly assert their 
copyright against the publisher.  Such actions are typically brought 
 
 31 See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 793 (2007). 
 32 Id. at 797.  As of October 21, 2007, there existed around 8,000 enforceable patents 
expressly reciting wireless telecommunications in their claims.  This figure was obtained 
by a focused search for patents relating to wireless telecommunications.  It is likely many 
more patents will also capture some subset of the field by covering, for example, 
batteries, displays, signal processing techniques, etc. 
 33 Id. at 794, 797–98. 
 34 Id. at 798. 
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under one of two legal theories: the termination right created by 
the Copyright Act of 1976,35 or ambiguities in the interpretation of 
a decade-old contract in view of new distribution technologies.36  It 
is understood that this strategy is most lucrative where the 
publisher has used the original work as a platform to build a major 
media franchise, which becomes a “sitting duck” for copyright 
infringement claims.37 
A different hold-up situation arises where the user of the work 
is aware of the copyright holder’s rights, but she believes that the 
use is legitimate.  This may happen, for example, where the 
defendant incorporates part of the plaintiff’s work into her own, 
under the assumption that the incorporation qualifies as fair use or 
de minimis.  For example, in the recent high-profile decision in 
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the operator of a soft-porn website sued 
Google and other internet search engines for displaying low-
resolution (“thumbnail”) versions of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
photographs as part of their search result pages.38  Since search 
engines index an enormous amount of content in a fully automated 
 
 35 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304. See, e.g., Siegel v. Time Warner Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1111 
(C.D. Cal. 2007); Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); see also Lauren Beth Emerson, Termination of Transfer of Copyright: Able to 
Leap Trademarks in a Single Bound?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 207, 248–51 (2006) 
(discussing the deadlock between the heirs of Superman’s original authors, who claim 
ownership in the copyright, and DC Comics, holder of various trademarks related to the 
comic-book character). 
 36 See, e.g., Welles v. Turner Entm’t Co., 503 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2007); Boosey & 
Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Rey v. 
Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 
F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968); Lee v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 37 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 35, at 241–42 (discussing the original authors’ heirs’ 
claim to damages exceeding $50 million, as a share of profits from all products 
associated with the “S” crest appearing on Superman’s costume); Woods v. Bourne Co., 
60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (copyright infringement action brought in the early 1990’s 
over a popular song written in 1926); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (heirs of author of Tarzan novels, dating as far back to 1912, 
seeking to enjoin production of a 1980 Hollywood blockbuster based on the original 
story). 
 38 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 713 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (similar fact pattern).  For an 
example involving more traditional media, see, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, 126 
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (commercial reproduction of a copyrighted painting used as 
background decoration in a television show). 
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way,39 it is likely that Google did not intentionally copy those 
images.  Moreover, the thumbnails were the result of Google’s 
indexing of third-party websites that posted Perfect 10’s images 
without authorization.40  Finally, the only economic harm alleged 
by Perfect 10 (the displacement of its own reduced-sized images 
for use on cell phones) was of debatable significance.41  All these 
facts point to the use of copyright protection to extract a fraction of 
Google’s huge profits rather than prevent free-riding on Perfect 
10’s efforts.  The hold-up plaintiff typically seeks an injunction, 
which would give her the power to severely harm, or even cripple, 
the defendant’s business.  This allows the plaintiff to exploit her 
temporary bargaining advantage and multiply the value of the 
work, since in some cases the only way to fully comply with an 
injunction is to shut down a web service altogether.42 
The policy debate on hold-up strategies mainly compares 
ethical arguments on one side to hard economic theory on the 
other.  On one hand, a hold-up plaintiff easily looks like an 
“extortionist,”43 especially when she uses the threat of an 
injunction to obtain a settlement above fair market value.44  On the 
other hand, this is a slippery-slope argument, which subjects basic 
property rights to an arbitrary “smell test” and thus endangers vital 
market mechanisms.  It is often difficult to distinguish the 
extortionist from the innovator who legitimately enforces her 
statutory rights, since in many of the cases cited above, the 
plaintiff is a highly creative artist in her own right.  In fact, it has 
been suggested that enforcing property rights, even in hold-up 
 
 39 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 711. 
 40 Id. at 713. 
 41 See id. at 724–25 (characterizing the harm as “hypothetical”); Britton Payne, 
Comment, Imperfect 10: Digital Advances and Market Impact in Fair Use Analysis, 17 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 289–93 (2006) (arguing that as a 
technical matter, it is unlikely that thumbnails could be used for display on cell phones). 
 42 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 31, at 800–02. 
 43 See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: 
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 465 (1995) (“‘[E]xtortion’ refers 
to the supposed power of the entitlement owner in a property-rule regime to hold out on 
the other (enjoined) party so as to extract all the gains from trade at stake in post-
injunction bargaining.”). 
 44 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 31, at 795. 
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situations, may be more likely to result in an efficient outcome 
than any other alternative.45 
These examples show that a copyright owner implementing a 
hold-up strategy exploits a bargaining advantage to extract a price 
that exceeds the fair market value of the work involved.  
Structurally, all hold-up cases follow the same pattern, and it does 
not really matter for the purposes of this discussion whether this is 
the result of accidental circumstances, opportunism, or even 
unethical conduct.  The defendant’s vulnerability typically derives 
from the concrete possibility of the plaintiff’s being granted an 
injunction and destroying the defendant’s business.46  Put another 
way, the interest at stake is essentially unrelated to the value of the 
underlying property—the copyrighted work is merely the key to 
the defendant’s vault.  The next section will look at situations 
where copyright owners make sure they own the key to their own 
vault. 
B. Technological Lock-out 
A lock-out strategy is the use of copyrighted material as a 
“password” to gain access to a proprietary resource.  A classic 
example from information theory can serve as an illustration.  The 
binary digits “0” and “1” are usually represented by simple 
physical objects, such as an open or closed circuit, or a dot or a 
dash as in Morse code.  However, it is just as legitimate to 
represent a “0” by the entire text of the King James Version of the 
Bible, and a “1” by the single word “Yes.”47  Certainly, that would 
be an inefficient way of communicating, but that is a purely 
technical issue.  There is also a more interesting legal issue: If the 
King James Bible were protected by copyright, one could not 
communicate without infringing its owner’s exclusive rights.48 
 
 45 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 43, at 453–55, 465–67. 
 46 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 31, at 800–02. 
 47 See CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATION 9 (Univ. Ill. Press 1964). 
 48 Although there would be no infringement for ordinary oral communication, the rights 
granted under 17 USC § 106 would come into play for any communication involving 
written media, public broadcast, etc. 
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Software and hardware companies have tried many times to 
use copyright to prevent competitors from selling products 
interoperable with their own.49  In the leading case of Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., Lexmark, a 
printer manufacturer, used a lock-out technique to implement a 
price discrimination strategy.50  Lexmark sold two models of 
replacement toner cartridges for its printers.51  Full-price cartridges 
could be refilled by the customers or by third parties.52  Buyers of 
discounted cartridges were obligated to return the cartridges to 
Lexmark for refilling.53  Lexmark made the customers’ contractual 
obligation self-enforcing by building a semiconductor chip into the 
discounted cartridges, carrying a short software program.54  The 
printer used two different digital signatures to verify that the 
program was actually present on the cartridge.55  If either 
verification step failed, the printer stopped working.56  Static 
Control Components (SCC) was a supplier of chips for competing 
toner-cartridge manufacturers.57  Because of Lexmark’s lock-out, 
the only way SCC could create a compatible chip was to copy the 
code verbatim, thus triggering a lawsuit for copyright 
infringement.58 
Information theory provides a simple interpretation, and a 
quantitative definition, of lock-out.  As in the King James Bible 
example, the copyrighted software program is used as a binary 
code.  The presence of the software indicates authorization (“1”); 
 
 49 See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187 
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 50 See 387 F.3d 522, 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 51 See id. at 529–30. 
 52 See id. at 530. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 529–30. 
 55 See id. at 530–31.  The two signatures were obtained by a 64-bit SHA-1 algorithm 
and an 8-bit checksum. Id.  It is unclear whether either was truly effective to “lock-out” 
competitors, since CCS had already broken Lexmark’s 64-bit encryption, and any 8-bit 
encryption, regardless of its complexity, can be easily cracked by trial and error. Id. at 
530.  For purposes of the following discussion, assume that Lexmark’s lock-out 
methodology was technologically effective. 
 56 See id. at 530–31. 
 57 See id. at 529. 
 58 See id. at 529–30. 
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its absence locks out the competitor (“0”).  In quantitative terms, 
the signature of a lock-out strategy is the mismatch between the 
high information content of a work of authorship, and the low 
quantity of information it conveys when used as a lock-out code.59  
A complex work such as the Bible is rich in information content, 
because the same story can be told in innumerable ways.60  
However all this information is wasted when the work is used to 
carry only one bit of information.  Even such a short program as 
Lexmark’s contained 55 bytes,61 or 440 bits of information.  Of 
course, since the program carried only one bit of effective 
information, the remaining 339 bits were redundant. 
Courts have generally not been very favorable to lock-out 
strategies.  For example, the Lexmark court suggested that the 
lock-out software program was too short to be worthy of copyright 
protection, or, equivalently, that the coding was entirely dictated 
by functional and efficiency constraints, and thus not sufficiently 
expressive even under the permissive Feist standard.62  Moreover, 
even if the software itself were protected under copyright law, its 
use as a lock-out code would cause the entirety of the expression to 
merge into its functionality.63  Finally, copying of a lock-out code 
for strict interoperability purposes could be covered by the fair use 
exception.64  Courts have recognized a fair use defense for reverse-
engineering where necessary to gain access to the functional 
aspects of a computer program.65  Likewise, the incorporation of 
copyrighted software into a new product to the minimum extent 
necessary for interoperability should also qualify as fair use.66 
 
 59 See Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative 
Model of “Authorship”, 2004 BYU L. REV. 69, 116–23 (2004) (proposing a definition of 
authorship in terms of the information content of a work). 
 60 See id. at 119. 
 61 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529–30. 
 62 Id. at 537–42; see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 n.7 
(9th Cir. 1992).  The Supreme Court set the standard for creativity in Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 63 See id. at 536. 
 64 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 65 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527–28. 
 66 Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: 
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 
1135 (1995); Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544–45. 
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Other forms of digital information have been used as lock-out 
codes, also without great success.  For example, software 
companies have asserted copyright over a user interface, i.e., a 
specific combination of inputs and outputs that a user needs to 
operate a program.67  Copyright infringement has also been 
claimed against competitors who copied non-executable binary 
codes necessary for software compatibility.68  A third example is 
the copyright protection of “operational outputs,” i.e., the streams 
of data that some computerized systems use during operation.69  
Courts have generally been hostile to such claims and have held in 
the defendant’s favor, generally on the basis that such lock-out 
codes are functional70 or lack sufficient originality.71  Even in the 
context of the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, which 
lack a true fair use exception,72 courts have often been unwilling to 
enforce lock-out strategies.73 
One would be tempted to think that lock-out strategies are 
peculiar to the computer industry.74  However, some have come up 
with the clever idea of using actual literary works, such as short 
poems or haikus, as lock-out codes.75  The idea seems to be that 
literary works are less likely to be found “functional” by a court 
than machine-readable code.  The reasoning in other decisions 
involving lock-out codes suggests that this strategy is unlikely to 
 
 67 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 68 See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 69 Matthew J. Leary, Welding the Hood Shut: The Copyrightability of Operational 
Outputs and the Software Aftermarket in Maintenance and Operations, 85 B.U. L. REV. 
1389, 1391–92 (2005). 
 70 See, e.g., Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815–19. 
 71 See, e.g., Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375. 
 72 Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1105–06 (2003). 
 73 See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 549–
50 (6th Cir. 2004); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 
1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 74 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 66, at 1108 (“Even among highly utilitarian literary 
works, the barriers to access created by distribution of computer programs in object code 
form have no analogue.”). 
 75 Rebecca Bolin, Opting Out of Spam: A Domain Level Do-Not-Spam Registry, 24 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 413 (2006). 
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work.76  In fact, the technique’s initial success was based on 
enforcement of trademark rather than copyright law.77 
As for hold-up strategies, one can find structural elements 
common to all technological lock-outs, regardless of whether one 
sides with the plaintiff or with the defendant in any particular case.  
It is not difficult to show that in every lock-out case, the fair 
market value of the copyrighted program or other code is 
negligible in comparison to the economic interests at stake.  For 
example, lock-out codes such as Lexmark’s 55-byte program78 are 
simple pieces of software that a competent programmer could 
replicate in a matter of days or even hours.  With respect to the 
lock-out haikus, one may imagine that the most pedestrian of 
literary creations would serve the purpose.  Surprisingly, however, 
elements of lock-out may also be found where the works at issue 
have unquestionable artistic significance, as discussed in the next 
section. 
C. Reputational Lock-out 
There is a significant body of case law involving uses of 
copyright law to prohibit the use of a work in association with 
certain forms of expression with which the plaintiff disagrees.79  
One could name this strategy “reputational lock-out” since it seeks 
to protect the plaintiff’s reputation rather than the work at issue.  
Perhaps the most famous recent example of this fact pattern is 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., in which the owners of the 
rights to Gone with the Wind unsuccessfully tried to enjoin 
publication of a parodic novel that aimed to expose and debunk the 
original work’s racist worldview.80  Another notorious example is 
Rogers v. Koons, in which a relatively obscure commercial 
photographer was granted an injunction, upheld on appeal, against 
 
 76 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544 (“A poem in the abstract could be copyrightable.  But 
that does not mean that the poem receives copyright protection when it is used in the 
context of a lock-out code.”). 
 77 John Leyden, Habeas Wins $100k Judgement Against Spammer, THE REGISTER, Apr. 
7, 2004,  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/07/habeas_spam_lawsuit. 
 78 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529–30. 
 79 For a review of leading cases, see Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright 
Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 55–58 (2007). 
 80 268 F.3d 1257, 1269, 1272–74 (11th Cir. 2001). 
PACELLI_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:32:02 PM 
2008] COPYRIGHT HOLD-UP & LOCK-OUT STRATEGIES 1247 
the world-renowned sculptor Jeff Koons.81  Koons’ intent was to 
create a parody of commercial images, which involved replicating 
one of Rogers’ postcards as part of an exhibition tellingly entitled 
“Banality Show.”82  An earlier example of reputational lock-out is 
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, in which Disney was 
granted a preliminary injunction, also affirmed on appeal, against 
the publication of a counterculture comic book representing 
Disney’s characters in unsavory circumstances.83  Other high-
profile cases involved attempts by the estates of famous artists to 
control their public images closely, even decades after the authors’ 
deaths.84 
At first sight, reputational lock-out would not appear to be 
relevant to our discussion.  Most of the attention in these cases has 
focused on issues of free speech and private censorship rather than 
on the plaintiffs’ business strategies.  In addition, since the interest 
at stake is not of a strictly economic nature, comparing the market 
value to the intrinsic value of the work seems to create a classic 
apples-and-oranges problem.85 
However, a scrutiny reveals close similarities to the lock-out 
strategies discussed in the previous section.  Where reputation is 
part of the brand image of a media franchise, a reputational lock-
out may have a substantial economic dimension.  As Professor 
Arewa observed in the context of artistic legacies, “[t]he strategic 
uses of copyright by heirs are rooted in the economic value of 
 
 81 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 82 Id. at 304, 309. 
 83 581 F.2d 751, 752–53 (9th Cir. 1978); see Bob Levin, Disney’s War Against the 
Counterculture, REASON, Dec. 2004, available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/ 
36416.html. 
 84 See, e.g., Shloss v. Sweeney, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76910 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2007) 
(estate of James Joyce seeking to prevent use of James and Lucia Joyce’s writings, with 
the sole apparent purpose of protecting the Joyce family’s privacy); Gershwin v. Whole 
Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (estate of George 
Gershwin seeking to prevent unauthorized musical play incorporating Gershwin’s songs, 
with the goal of protecting the integrity of “carefully sculptured works of art”). 
 85 See Heymann, supra note 79, at 58 (“[T]hese creators are not truly seeking to trade 
on the incentives given to them by copyright law and the economic rights that come from 
the limited monopoly copyright law grants.”). 
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streams of licensing revenues from copyright-protected works.”86  
Arewa discusses in detail the strategies of the Gershwin estate, 
which went so far as to refuse to release photographs of Ira and 
George Gershwin unless they were first airbrushed to remove 
unsightly stubble.87   
Strong economic elements can be found in each of the cases 
discussed above.  In the SunTrust opinion, the court observed that 
Gone with the Wind “has become one of the best-selling books in 
the world, second in sales only to the Bible”,88 and that an 
important component of the copyright holder’s seven-figure 
licensing agreements was not to authorize any other derivative 
works.89  Similarly, Disney’s action in Air Pirates was a clear 
example of lock-out: using copyright protection to protect its 
investment in building a brand associated with wholesome 
entertainment.90  Although the plaintiff in Rogers v. Koons appears 
to have mainly been seeking an injunction, he also demanded 
Koons’ considerable profits from sales of the infringing 
sculptures.91 
Even accounting for the economic value of reputation, it is 
more difficult to see a disparity between a work’s intrinsic value 
and market value in reputational lock-out than it is in technological 
lock-out.  For example, in cases involving the estates of famous 
authors the works at issue are of such stature that it is difficult to 
see them as mere “lock-out codes.”  As much as legal theorists 
purport to adopt a content-neutral stance toward copyright 
protection,92 it is hard to ignore the significance of certain works.  
One could probably argue with a straight face that the Gershwin 
 
 86 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and 
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 321 (2006). 
 87 Id. 
 88 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 89 Id. at 1274. 
 90 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he 
essence of this parody did not focus on how the characters looked, but rather parodied 
their personalities, their wholesomeness and their innocence.”). 
 91 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) (Koons’ profits totaling 
$367,000).  In this sense, Rogers’ strategy was a mixture of lock-out and hold-up.  This 
aspect of the case is further discussed in Part III, infra. 
 92 Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151, 1156–58 (2007). 
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estate’s extravagant demands are a small price to pay in return for 
the world to enjoy Rhapsody in Blue.  It is more difficult to 
maintain the proverbial straight face when, as was the case in Air 
Pirates, a copyrighted work transmogrifies into a brand image.  
The next section addresses this particular case of lock-out. 
D. Brand Lock-out 
Copyright protection, and in particular the exclusive right of 
adaptation, is extensively used to create and protect franchises 
based on popular entertainment.  This strategy may be called 
“brand lock-out” since it aims at excluding others from using a 
commercial brand that sprung out of the original work.  Brand 
lock-out has two main purposes: first, to exercise complete control 
over a brand image, and prevent others from interfering with the 
business strategies associated with it; second, to prevent free-riders 
from benefiting from the positive associations that the brand 
enjoys among the general public.  Some examples of reputational 
lock-out certainly display some features of brand lock-out, for 
example, when copyright is used to defend the reputation of an 
artist and thus protect the associated licensing revenue stream.  
This section more specifically discusses situations where the work 
itself becomes the brand, as in the case of cartoon characters. 
As the Air Pirates decision shows, cartoon and comic book 
characters are eminently suitable for lock-out use.  Due to their 
highly distinctive visual image, cartoon characters do not suffer 
from the elusiveness of non-graphically depicted literary 
characters.93  In fact, even a stock character, which would be 
unprotected if represented in a purely literary form, becomes 
copyrightable once given a visual appearance in a comic book.94  
Alternatively, the visual appearance of characters qualifies for 
protection as a pictorial work under the copyright statute.95  
 
 93 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755; Emerson, supra note 35, at 214–19; Jasmina Zecevic, 
Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters That Constitute the Story Being Told: Who 
Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection?, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 365, 369 (2006). 
 94 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 95 Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 754; 17 U.S.C. 102(a)(5) (2006) (granting copyright 
protection to “pictorial . . . works”). 
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Moreover, copying a character’s image alone constitutes copyright 
infringement, and a defendant is not entitled to a fair use defense 
even where the use is transformative.96 
Even more than lock-out programs and lock-out haikus, lock-
out characters provide the strong exclusive rights required to 
protect a substantial investment.  Of course, media companies have 
taken full advantage of the strong protection provided by copyright 
law.  In 2006, the Walt Disney Company boasted annual revenues 
exceeding $34 billion.97  A large part of this amount is at least 
closely related to Disney’s ownership of its numerous cartoon 
characters.  About $10 billion (29%) of Disney’s revenue is 
associated with parks and resorts.98  One must wonder how much 
business Walt Disney World and Disneyland would lose if the 
average American family could visit Mickey in a competitor’s 
amusement park within driving distance from home, rather than 
having to fly all the way to Anaheim or Orlando.  An army of 300 
lawyers99 defends this empire with legendary aggressiveness.100 
Ownership of the copyright in the Mickey Mouse character is 
one of the capstones of Disney’s legal fortress.  If Congress had let 
the copyright on the original 1928 Mickey short, Steamboat Willie, 
expire in 2003, that single work would have fallen into the public 
domain.101  Disney was probably not too worried about low-cost 
copies of Steamboat Willie flooding the market.102  What must 
 
 96 See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 757–58 (finding that verbatim copy of comic-book 
characters in a parody was not fair use, where a lesser amount of copying would have 
been sufficient to evoke the characters in the minds of the readers). 
 97 THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, http://corporate.disney.go.com/ 
investors/annual_reports/2006/int/fh.html. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Don Parret, Disney Legal Department Restructure Announced, METROPOLITAN 
NEWS-ENTERPRISE, June 19, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.metnews.com/articles/ 
disn061903.htm. 
 100 Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public 
Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 429 (1994). 
 101 Id. at 430–31 & n.8.  Of course the doomsday scenario did not materialize since 
Congress extended copyright protection for 20 more years in 1998. See generally 
Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and 
the Copyright Act of 1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254 (2003) for a detailed legal 
history of the early Mickey movies. 
 102 As of October 20, 2007, the Vintage Mickey DVD featuring the Steamboat Willie 
short (which lasts less than 8 minutes) ranked #7,289 in Amazon.com DVD sales, 
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have horrified Disney’s lawyers was that the lapsing of Steamboat 
Willie into the public domain would have caused an enormous loss 
in sales of merchandise and services.  In other words, the 
adaptation rights of Steamboat Willie are Disney’s lock-out code—
the key to the magic kingdom that took the company decades (and 
billions of dollars) to build. 
Copyright law is certainly not the only tool available to protect 
cartoon characters, however it is a key component of many media 
empires’ intellectual property strategies.103  For example, attempts 
to enforce trademark rights separately from copyright have met 
with mixed success.104  Moreover, the 2003 Supreme Court 
decision in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox stands for the 
proposition that trademark law cannot be used to extend copyright 
protection beyond its statutory term.105  If one day Steamboat 
Willie will fall in the public domain, Disney will face the concrete 
possibility that competitors may put Mickey’s face on their 
products, as long as they clearly indicate the source of the goods.  
For example, Nike could hypothetically launch a line of children’s 
sneakers branded “Air Mickey.”  It is likely that two large and 
sophisticated companies such as Nike and Disney would settle in 
advance any potential disagreements, for example by negotiating 
royalty payments to Disney.  However, the expiration of the 
copyright on Mickey, in light of the adverse decision in Dastar, 
would certainly weaken Disney’s bargaining position and could 
result in much lower royalty payments. 
One could argue that there is a substantial difference between 
Mickey Mouse and a piece of software.  How can one compare a 
combination of zeros and ones with the lovely mouse that virtually 
every human being knows and loves?  Certainly, our imaginary 
opponent would say, there must be something “magic” in Mickey’s 
 
compared with #156 for The Lion King (special platinum edition) and #206 for Cars 
(widescreen edition). 
 103 See Litman, supra note 100, at 429; Gerald S. Jagorda, The Mouse That Roars: 
Character Protection Strategies of Disney and Others, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 235, 
240–43 (1999); Emerson, supra note 35, at 210–11 & n.31 (citing several cases in which 
media companies asserted a combination of copyright, trademark and unfair competition 
claims). 
 104 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 35, at 227–36. 
 105 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). 
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looks, some secret ingredient that explains his tremendous success.  
The problem with this argument is that there really seems to be 
nothing special about Mickey.  Before 1928, Disney’s main 
character was a rodent named Oswald the Lucky Rabbit.106  
Oswald was just as cute and lovely as Mickey, and just like 
Mickey, he was the creation of Walt Disney and his chief 
animator, Ub Iwerks.107  Like Mickey, Oswald had a white face, a 
black nose, prominent black ears (elongated rather than round), 
and wore boxer shorts with two buttons in the front.108  It is 
difficult to tell which one is lovelier.  Yet, at some point, the studio 
decided to dump Oswald and focus on Mickey.  Needless to say, 
artistic similarity does not translate into a similarity in market 
valuation. 
Perhaps, one could argue, there really is something special 
about Mickey, which the superficial similarity with Oswald does 
not reveal.  Perhaps, the reason why Mickey replaced Oswald is 
that Mickey’s visual appearance was uniquely and exceptionally 
recognizable by the public.  This feature has a name—it is part of 
distinctiveness, and it is plays an important role in trademark law.  
Distinctiveness is the ability to identify a source of goods clearly in 
the eyes of the public, and it is a requirement for enforcement of a 
trademark under the Lanham Act.109  However, there is no such 
thing as a distinctiveness requirement in copyright law.  The 
“catchiness” of a visual image is a factual issue often argued in 
trademark lawsuits, but it has no legal significance in the copyright 
context. 
The Oswald/Mickey example highlights a common feature of 
all lock-out codes.  The difference between Oswald and Mickey is 
the same that exists between two keys: One opens my front door, 
the other does not, but they are otherwise identical.  Professor 
 
 106 Wikipedia, Oswald the Lucky Rabbit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oswald_the_ 
Lucky_Rabbit (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.  For purposes of this discussion, neglect the issue of whether Mickey is so close 
to Oswald that copying Oswald would infringe the copyright in Mickey, and vice versa.  
Suffice it to say that Disney cannot certainly claim a copyright on cute cartoon animals. 
See Litman, supra note 100, at 433–34. 
 109 See, e.g., Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 
1047 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Cohen made a similar point with respect to lock-out strategies 
based on patent protection: A lock-out device has no distinguishing 
features over the prior art other than its particular, unique 
protection algorithm, which is not patentable unless it is inventive 
in itself.110 
Now, it is possible to prove that the intrinsic value of a cartoon 
character used as a lock-out code is far less than its market value.  
Since Mickey’s demand curves are distorted by Disney’s brand-
building efforts, one may rely on the “shortcut” discussed at the 
end of Part I.  The reasoning goes as follows: consider two works 
of comparable artistic value, such as Oswald and Mickey.  One 
must take it as self-evident that the total economic or social 
welfare associated with the works as such (i.e., their intrinsic 
value) cannot be too different.  It stretches credulity to argue that a 
hypothetical consumer who has not been exposed to 80 years of 
Disney marketing will love Mickey and hate Oswald, or vice versa.  
For the sake of simplicity, let’s posit that the intrinsic value of both 
Oswald and Mickey is X. Mickey is the key to Disney’s vault, 
which contains a very large amount of money—let’s call that Y.111  
Nobody could dispute that Oswald’s intrinsic value, X, is far less 
than Y—as enjoyable as they are, cute characters like Oswald are a 
dime a dozen.  However, Mickey’s intrinsic value is the same as 
Oswald’s, i.e., X. Ergo, Mickey is a lock-out code, because its 
market price, Y, far exceeds its intrinsic value, X.  QED. 
The above “proof” is based on an intuition and should not be 
taken too literally.  The point is that there may be a big discrepancy 
between what a copyrighted work is really worth and what people 
are willing to pay for it.  Of course, the source of the discrepancy 
originates in external factors, such as marketing and promotion of 
the brand.  The same is true for many other examples of strategic 
 
 110 See Cohen, supra note 66, at 1174–75. 
 111 As of November 6, 2007, Disney’s market capitalization was around $65 billion.  
Whatever the fraction of this figure is attributable to Mickey, it’s likely in the billion-
dollar range.  For an analysis of the effect of changes in copyright law on the valuation of 
public companies, see Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, Court Decisions 
and Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection, 49 J.L. & ECON. 567, 
569–70 (2006). 
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uses of copyright.  The next section attempts to tie all those 
examples together. 
III. A UNIFIED PICTURE OF HOLD-UP AND LOCK-OUT STRATEGIES 
Both hold-up and lock-out strategies involve the use of a 
copyrighted work as the key to a vault that contains the fruits of 
someone’s effort or investment.  In Perfect 10 (hold-up),112 the 
investment at stake was Google’s effort spent in creating its search 
algorithms and conquering market share.  In Lexmark (technology 
lock-out),113 it was the printer manufacturer’s initial investment in 
research and development, and also the loss incurred in selling 
printers at a low cost in the expectation of profiting from sales of 
toner cartridges.  In Air Pirates (brand lock-out),114 it was Disney’s 
marketing and brand-building work.  The only difference between 
hold-up and lock-out, then, is whose money is at stake—the 
plaintiff’s or the defendant’s. 
Even more interestingly, there are situations in which both 
sides contribute money to the vault.  In fact, the ability of a 
plaintiff or a defendant to tell a good story to a judge or jury may 
depend on their being able to claim a credible right to the fruits of 
their past efforts.  Sometimes elements of hold-up may be 
incidental to a lock-out strategy, and vice versa.  In Rogers v. 
Koons (reputational lock-out), the plaintiff’s expression was 
certainly harmed from being portrayed (or, rather, sculpted) as a 
prime example of “Banality” and as a contributing factor to the 
“deterioration in the quality of society.”115  This would suggest a 
lock-out pattern.  At the same time, Koons put great efforts into 
creating the infringing sculptures, for example commissioning 
custom porcelain and woodcarving jobs from specialized European 
firms.116  Koons also made a substantial amount of money from 
sales of the sculptures, the money which Rogers sought to 
 
112 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
113 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
114 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 115 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 116 Id. at 304–05. 
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recover.117  These facts suggest that Rogers’ strategy had some 
elements of hold-up, not in the sense of threatening an injunction, 
but more generally as targeting the defendant’s assets.118  
Understandably, the appellate court affirming the injunction 
emphasized the plaintiff’s artistic reputation (i.e., his lock-out 
posture) while depicting the defendant as a “controversial artist” 
whose art some find “truly offensive” (i.e., downplaying the hold-
up-like element).119 
Finally, there may be truly hybrid situations where a plaintiff 
seeks to protect her investment while simultaneously capturing that 
of a competitor.  It has been suggested that the record companies’ 
and film studios’ aggressive enforcement of their rights often has 
the ultimate purpose of blocking potentially disruptive new 
technologies.120  For example, a new entrant in the market for the 
digital distribution of music necessarily needs access to existing 
materials owned by traditional record companies, which have 
every incentive to refuse a license in order to protect their sales of 
old-fashioned media.  On the one hand, the record companies want 
to protect their own past investment; on the other hand, their long-
term goal may be to eventually grab a new market that someone 
else pioneered at great expense. 
The strategic analysis of a copyright dispute requires asking 
two questions.  First, to what extent is the use strategic?  It is 
important to note that the “vault” of our metaphor only contains 
the difference between market price and intrinsic value of the 
copyrighted work.  If the work is objectively valuable, and the 
 
 117 Id. at 306, 312–13. 
 118 Traditional hold-up strategies rely on property rules (threat of an injunction), 
whereas Rogers’ claim against Koons’ assets was based on a liability rule (demand for 
money damages).  However the distinction blurs where, as in that case, the law forces a 
defendant to disgorge the entirety of his gains from the infringing activities.  The liability 
rule then results in the highest payment that a rational defendant would make to settle the 
plaintiff’s claim. 
 119 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303–04. 
 120 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Assessing Alternative Compensation Models for Online Content 
Consumption, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 645, 666 (2006); Hannibal Travis, Building Universal 
Digital Libraries: An Agenda for Copyright Reform, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 789 n.192 
(2006); John A. Fedock, The RIAA v. the People: The Recording Industry’s Misguided 
Attempt to Use the Legal System to Save Their Business Model, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 947, 
956–57 (2005). 
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transfer of rights involves payment of a price comparable to the 
value of the work, there is no strategic use of the work.  In the 
context of our metaphor, the “key” is made of solid gold and 
encrusted with ten-carat diamonds.  This of course is the story that 
a hold-up or lock-out plaintiff will try to tell the judge or the jury.  
“Mickey is magic” sounds a lot better than “we spent decades 
growing this silly cartoon character into a major media franchise 
and we are entitled to a perpetual revenue stream.”  The second 
question is, whose interest is at stake?  In a “perfect” hold-up 
situation the plaintiff finds herself owning the key to the 
defendant’s vault.  In a “perfect” lock-out scenario the plaintiff 
accuses the defendant of stealing the key to her own vault.  
Intermediate cases lie somewhere in between.  If there is a clear 
and undeniable strategic component to the suit, the plaintiff would 
rather tell a lock-out story than a hold-up story. 
The two questions just discussed form the basis for a visual 
representation that may help understanding the parties’ postures in 
any copyright dispute.  This can be done with a bit of math, 
without any pretense of developing a rigorous quantitative analysis 
of the problem.  The starting point is the intrinsic value of the 
work, which one assumes is a knowable quantity (with the caveats 
discussed in Part I).  The work’s value is indicated with the symbol 
V.  VB is the value added by the plaintiff (apart from the value of 
the work itself), and VD the value added by the defendant.  These 
added values will also include any return on the initial investment 
made—in short, they represent what the plaintiff and the defendant 
are entitled to by reason of their efforts.  The total sum at stake is 
then: 
S = V + VB + VD 
One can now define a “hold-up index” X, equal to the ratio of 
the defendant’s added value to the total amount at stake: 
X = VD / S = VD /(V + VB + VD) 
Values of X run from zero (pure lock-out, VD = 0) to one (pure 
hold-up, VD = S).  Hybrid cases, of course, fall somewhere in 
between.  For example, if plaintiff and defendant contribute equal 
investments, and V is negligible, X is equal to 0.5. 
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The variable X identifies the situation as a hold-up or a lock-
out, assuming that the plaintiff is already making strategic use of 
copyright law.  One can add another variable that distinguishes 
strategic from non-strategic situations if one complicates things a 
bit.  A “strategic index” Y may be defined as the ratio of the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s added values to the total amount at 
stake: 
Y = (VB + VD) / S 
Since VB + VD = S – V, the expression for Y may be rewritten 
in a more convenient form: 
Y = (S – V) / S = 1 – V / S 
Just like X, the parameter Y can take any value from zero (no 
strategic dimension, V = S) to one (V = 0, meaning that the work 
at issue is in itself worthless). 
The space defined by the parameters X and Y may now be 
represented in graphical form.  A “strategic space” may be defined 
as the square area encompassing all possible values of X and Y 
ranging between zero and one.   
In terms of litigation strategy, a plaintiff will typically argue 
that her strategic index is zero (i.e., she owns a “golden key”).  As 
a fallback argument, she will try to show that her hold-up index is 
zero (i.e., she put a lot of effort into developing the work).  Vice 
versa, a defendant will seek to prove that the plaintiff’s strategic 
index is close to one (i.e., the work at issue is in itself worthless) 
and that the hold-up index is also close to one (i.e., the plaintiff is 
using copyright law to benefit from the defendant’s hard work).  
However, even if the plaintiff wins on the X front, she may lose for 
the mere fact that her Y-value is high, if the defendant can 
convince the judge or jury that the plaintiff’s lock-out strategy is 
unfair or anti-competitive.  The following diagram shows the 
strategic space and the parties’ preferred locations in that space: 
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The diagram also shows where four of the cases discussed 
above could be tentatively positioned based on what is known 
about the facts of each case.  Lexmark is a pure lock-out case since 
the copyrighted work is merely an access code (V = 0), and the 
interest at stake is entirely represented by the plaintiff’s business 
interest or added value (VD = 0, S = VB).  Accordingly, Lexmark 
ends up on the top left corner of the diagram (X = 0, Y = 1).  
Perfect 10 seems to be a pure hold-up case, since both the value of 
the low-resolution pictures and the value added by Perfect 10 are 
probably small as compared to Google’s potential loss (V = VB = 
0, S = VD).  Therefore it is placed at the top right corner of the 
diagram (X = Y = 1).  SunTrust is only partially strategic, as the 
original work, though it may be criticized on political grounds, is 
certainly appreciated by many people.  However the work has also 
been heavily developed, therefore the plaintiff contributed a non-
negligible value, probably much higher than the defendant did.  
Accordingly, one can neglect VD and position this case on the left 
side of the diagram (X = 0, Y somewhere between 0 and 1).  
Finally, Rogers is a true hybrid case, as none of the three quantities 
in play (V, VB and VD) seems to be entirely negligible.  This case 
must be located somewhere in the middle of the diagram, as 
neither X or Y seems to be very close to zero or one. 
Having discussed the close similarities between hold-up and 
lock-out strategies, one wonders whether it makes any sense to 
approve one and condemn the other.  In quantitative terms, can one 
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draw a vertical line on the strategic space separating “good” from 
“bad” strategies?  Courts have relied on all sorts of ad-hoc 
doctrines to deal with strategic litigations, while generally ignoring 
their common characteristics.  This issue is explored in the next 
section.  What is interesting to note at this point is that, while 
completely different criticisms have been leveled at both hold-up 
and lock-out strategies, the proposed solutions could work in both 
situations.  For example, it has been suggested that the problem of 
hold-up could be addressed by replacing property rules with 
liability rules.121  The same approach could be just as effective in 
the lock-out context, by allowing use of lock-out codes in 
exchange for a reasonable royalty. 
IV. DO STRATEGIC USES EXCEED THE BOUNDARIES OF  
COPYRIGHT LAW? 
A.  Copyright Law as “Mutant Trademark Law” 
Strategic uses of copyright law display a close similarity to 
trademark protection.  One of the goals of trademark law is to 
protect the information capital embodied in a mark.122  Like a 
trademark, a copyrighted work used strategically has a relatively 
small intrinsic value, but may protect a substantial capital.  For 
example, the copyright in a lock-out code operates to protect not 
the code as such, but the investment associated with that code.  
Also, like the value of a trademark, the market value of a lock-out 
code rises as its owner invests in the underlying business, and 
likewise the “extortion value” of a work used in a hold-up strategy 
increases as the defendant’s business grows. 
Courts have recognized to some extent the trademark-like 
nature of lock-out strategies.  In its opinion in Gershwin v. Whole 
Thing Co., one of the cases involving the Gershwin estate, the 
court aptly wrote: 
Mr. Gershwin will suffer irreparable injury because 
of the kind of intangible property he is seeking to 
 
 121 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 31, at 784–85. 
 122 See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 168. 
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protect.  For each of their musical plays, the 
Gershwins were creating a work of art, a sculpture 
of music and lyrics.  Over the years, each of the 
Gershwin sculptures has acquired substantial 
goodwill and Mr. Gershwin has always sought to 
preserve the goodwill associated with the Gershwin 
compositions.123 
Such emphasis on protection of goodwill raises a red flag—
black letter law dictates that it is trademark law, not copyright law 
that protects goodwill.124  The Copyright Act and the Lanham Act 
protect different interests and create independent, if occasionally 
overlapping, legal protections.125 
While the analogy between trademark protection and lock-out 
strategies is relatively straightforward, most hold-up fact patterns 
can also be analogized to trademark disputes.  First, all hold-up 
cases involving a fair use defense can be analogized to fights over 
ownership or validity of a mark: The defendant argues that she, as 
a member of the public, “owns” those aspects of a work that 
properly belong in the public domain.  Second, a lock-out strategy 
can turn into a hold-up, and vice versa.  Air Pirates, for example, 
was a clear lock-out situation.  However, if defendants had 
succeeded in showing fair use, they would have found themselves 
in a hold-up position, as Disney would probably have paid them 
much more than they would possibly have made by sales of an 
“underground” comic book.126  Finally, even where it takes some 
imagination to see the analogy to trademark protection, one can 
point to the structural similarity to the underlying operation of 
 
 123 Gershwin v. Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, *9 (C.D. Ca. 1980). 
 124 See, e.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 190 (1985) 
(one of the Lanham Act’s goals is “providing national protection of trademarks in order 
to secure to the mark’s owner the goodwill of his business”). 
 125 See, e.g., Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(discussing the policies of the two statutes and recognizing a cause of action for “reverse 
passing off” of plaintiff’s book as separate from copyright infringement). 
 126 A total of 40,000 copies of the infringing works were sold. See Walt Disney Prods. v. 
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978).  Of course if defendants had triumphed 
over Disney the resulting celebrity effect would have multiplied the commercial value of 
their work.  Also, whether defendants would have accepted Disney’s money is something 
one will never know. 
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trademark law, which allows an intellectual property owner 
exclusive rights over a cipher that has no meaning or value in 
itself, except as a single bit of information that is critically 
connected to its owner’s business. 
The similarity between a copyright action with a high 
“strategic index” and a trademark action begs the question of 
whether copyright law is the right tool to achieve the plaintiff’s 
goals.  There are several reasons why this may not be the case.  
First of all, at least some strategic uses of copyright law might 
exceed the boundaries of the constitutional mandate.  American 
intellectual property law, as embodied in the Patent and Copyright 
Clause of the United States Constitution, seeks to avoid the grant 
of arbitrary monopolies to the detriment of the public.127  This 
concept is embodied in the constitutional requirement that 
copyright law “promote . . .  Progress.”128  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that, while Congress has wide latitude to select the 
appropriate protection scheme,129 it is nevertheless bound by the 
constitutional mandate.130  As an example highly pertinent to this 
discussion, the Supreme Court ruled almost 130 years ago that 
Congress does not have power to protect common trademarks 
under the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, because 
“[t]he ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention 
or discovery”, and because “[t]he writings which are to be 
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form 
of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”131 
One can certainly argue, as the court in Gershwin implicitly 
did, that protection of the goodwill associated with the work is one 
of the mechanisms through which copyright law fulfills its 
constitutional mandate of “promot[ing] . . . Progress.”132  As 
 
 127 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 129 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[W]e are not at liberty to second-
guess congressional determinations and policy judgments [with respect to extensions of 
the copyright term,] however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
 130 Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
 131 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis in original). 
 132 See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
2.16 (2007) (a well-known title may be the only valuable element of a copyrighted work 
which is itself based upon public domain materials) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; 
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discussed in Part I, the beneficial effects of copyright protection 
extend far beyond the direct impact on the creation of new works, 
for example by supporting a democratic civil society.133  As 
Professor Frischmann has acknowledged, “it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify the point at which copyright has gone too 
far.”134  On the other hand, a point of diminishing returns must 
exist, as internalization carries its own inefficiencies, and at some 
point, the costs of internalization begin to exceed its benefits.135 
Even assuming that strategic uses of copyright are generally 
constitutional, some could be barred by the “principle of election” 
under which forms of intellectual property protection may be 
mutually exclusive.  While the Copyright Act expressly allows 
other federal statutes, such as the Lanham Act, to provide 
overlapping protection,136 the reverse is not necessarily true.  
Nothing in the statute expressly allows copyright law to reach 
areas of protection under other intellectual property regimes, and 
other federal law could be interpreted as curtailing a copyright 
owner’s rights.137  Although the general applicability of the 
principle of election has been challenged,138 its influence can be 
found throughout intellectual property law.  As mentioned above, 
Dastar prevents trademark law from overreaching into the domain 
of copyright.  At least one lower court has already extrapolated the 
reasoning in Dastar to similarly prevent the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act from turning into “a species of mutant 
 
Frischmann, supra note 5, at 668 (“The supply side incentives that copyright affects 
extend beyond the initial investment in creation to investments in development and 
dissemination of content.”). 
 133 Netanel, supra note 28. 
 134 Frischmann, supra note 5, at 662. 
 135 See id. at 658; Lemley, supra note 2, at 1058–65 (summarizing arguments against 
granting overbroad intellectual property rights); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1204–09 (1996) (arguing that increasing 
copyright protection beyond compensation for an author’s opportunity cost yields limited 
benefits, while hampering the production of new works). 
 136 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2006) (“Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or 
remedies under any other Federal statute.”); see also 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 132, § 1.01[D][1]. 
 137 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 132, § 1.01[D][1]. 
 138 See Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (rejecting patent 
examiner’s argument that prior copryight registration estopped applicant from obtaining a 
design patent). 
PACELLI_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:32:02 PM 
2008] COPYRIGHT HOLD-UP & LOCK-OUT STRATEGIES 1263 
trademark/copyright law, blurring the boundaries between the law 
of trademarks and that of copyright.”139 
The strength of copyright protection under the current legal 
regime threatens to make trademark law redundant.  To paraphrase 
Justice Scalia in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, is it right for 
copyright law to become a sort of “mutant trademark law?”140  If it 
is, why bother having a trademark law at all?  Most graphical 
trademarks such as corporate logos certainly also qualify for 
copyright protection as pictorial works, since they pass the very 
low creativity threshold set by the Supreme Court in Feist.141  A 
lock-out copyright may offer stronger protection than a trademark.  
For example, since the Constitution allows Congress to keep 
extending the copyright term indefinitely,142 copyright protection 
might even outlast a trademark, which can become abandoned.143 
Moreover, reliance on copyright law to achieve the same 
effects as trademark protection runs exactly contrary to both 
established practices and recent trends in the media economy.  The 
Clorox Company has long benefited from trademark protection to 
apply supracompetitive prices for bleach, a generic household 
chemical with no proprietary qualities.  Likewise, Johnson & 
Johnson prices Listerine above its generic substitutes, many 
decades after the once-secret formula has become widely 
known.144  A firm does not even need full trademark protection to 
enjoy the benefits of a strong brand—Bayer charges a premium 
price for its Aspirin long after the mark “Aspirin” itself has been 
 
 139 The IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D.N.J. 
2006). 
 140 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) 
(“[A]llowing a cause of action under § 43(a) . . . would create a species of mutant 
copyright law . . . .”). 
 141 Feist Publ’gs, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 142 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 143 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen any 
course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes 
the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with 
which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.”). 
 144 See Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 667 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (formula for Listerine became publicly known before 1949, and possibly 
as early as 1905). 
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found generic.145  In recent years, even industries traditionally 
relying on strong copyright protection have moved toward 
alternative forms of protection for their investment.  For example, 
the software company Red Hat protects its business interests 
through trademark law, instead of copyright law, by selling 
consulting and services centered on a product (the Linux operating 
system) that is essentially free.146  Similarly, artists with strong 
celebrity appeal and broad following are exploring ways to extract 
revenue from their image (e.g., through sales of concert tickets and 
merchandise) rather than from licensing the copyright on their 
works.147 
Professors Parchomowsky and Siegelman have suggested that 
a welfare-enhancing synergy exists between copyright and 
trademark protection.148  They argue that in some cases trademark 
law may extend the effective term of protection under copyright 
and patent law, and the rational intellectual property owner will 
seek to maximize her profits over this entire extended term.149  In 
order to do so, she will demand lower prices during the statutory 
patent or copyright protection term, in order to enhance her brand 
image and extract higher revenue during the extended term under 
trademark law.150  One could imagine that the same synergy would 
apply where trademark and copyright merge.  However, as 
Parchomowsky and Siegelman observe, “copyright protection is so 
long as to render the additional protection term afforded by 
trademark law virtually meaningless.”151  Even more importantly, 
strategic uses of copyright law do not supplement trademark law, 
but virtually replace it.  The welfare-enhancing effect advocated 
by Parchomowsky and Siegelman never materializes, because a 
 
 145 See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding mark 
“Aspirin” to have become generic). 
 146 See, e.g., David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1238. 
 147 Michael Geist, Music Industry Needs Innovation Not Intervention, TORONTO STAR, 
Oct. 15, 2007, available at http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/266737. 
 148 Gideon Parchomowsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1497–1500 (2002). 
 149 Id. at 1462–63. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 1499. 
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copyright holder enjoys practically perpetual rights.152  In other 
words, since nobody ever gets to sell the “Air Mickey” sneakers, 
Disney does not have to lower prices during the period of 
exclusivity in order to secure brand loyalty for purposes of 
trademark protection. 
B. Copyright Misuse 
In addition to being in tension with legal standards, strategic 
uses of copyright protection may be attacked on equitable grounds 
through the doctrine of copyright misuse.153  Copyright misuse is 
an equitable defense to a claim of copyright infringement, 
historically related to the doctrine of “unclean hands.”154  It 
prevents a plaintiff from coming to a court of equity to seek an 
injunction if she has abused her rights as a copyright holder.155  
Thus, the doctrine of copyright misuse seeks to extend the 
traditional role of a court as a “balancer of equities” to safeguard 
the fundamental public policies underlying the statutory scheme.156  
These policies include the protection of competition in the 
marketplace and the safeguarding of free speech.157  In fact, most 
of the leading decisions applied the doctrine against licensing 
agreements that included anti-competitive clauses.158  A few 
opinions discussed, without deciding, the application of copyright 
 
 152 Cf. id. at 1463 (suggesting that at the expiration of the copyright or patent term, new 
market entrants will lower market prices to marginal cost). 
 153 On copyright misuse, see Brett Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving 
Doctrine of Copyright Misuse (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914535 
[hereinafter Frischmann & Moylan, Copyright Misuse]; Brett Frischmann & Dan 
Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory 
and its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000) [hereinafter 
Frischmann & Moylan, Software Copyright Misuse]; Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking 
Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2005). 
 154 Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Frischmann & Moylan, Software Copyright Misuse, supra note 153, at 877. 
 157 Judge, supra note 153, at 930–31. 
 158 See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 
1997) (licensing agreement for a medical manual prohibiting the licensee from using 
competing coding systems for medical procedures); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 
911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (software licensing agreement prohibiting the licensee from 
developing or selling competing software). 
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misuse to protect the free speech rights of a licensee159 or to 
prevent abuse of process by a licensor.160 
At first sight, copyright misuse would appear to be the ideal 
tool to preempt strategic uses of copyright protection.  By 
definition, hold-up and lock-out strategies seek to protect interests 
unrelated to the work whose copyright is being enforced.  
Professor Heymann has suggested that copyright claims should be 
dismissed under the doctrine of copyright misuse where a plaintiff 
seeks to protect her reputational, rather than economic, interests.161  
Those interests could be adequately protected by narrower, 
trademark-like remedies.162  With few exceptions, the interests at 
stake in lock-out and hold-up situations are most often of an 
economic sort, so Heymann’s theory does not strictly apply to the 
general problem of strategic copyright lawsuits.  However, her 
reasoning should apply to situations where the creator of a work is 
not “seeking to control the use of the work qua work.”163  This 
would include not only reputational lock-out, but also other types 
of lock-out, as well as hold-up situations. 
Structurally, application of the copyright misuse defense to 
strategic copyright enforcement requires some careful adjustments.  
Misuse is triggered by the copyright holder’s use of her rights in a 
manner contrary to public policy, and renders a copyright 
unenforceable even against defendants who were not parties to the 
original inequitable transaction.164  Conceptually, there is a two-
step process: (1) an inequitable act, which (2) operates to bar 
subsequent equitable relief.  In some cases, the two steps have a 
common origin, for example, infringement may arise from a 
 
 159 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203–06 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (recognizing the patent misuse defense as a safeguard of free speech rights, but 
declining to apply the doctrine to bar enforcement of a copyright license prohibiting the 
licensee from displaying the work in a form that was derogatory to or critical of the 
licensor). 
 160 Assessment Techs. of Wis., L.L.C. v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 
2003) (discussing, without deciding, the applicability of the misuse defense where a 
copyright owner uses an infringement suit to effectively gain rights not granted under 
copyright law). 
 161 Heymann, supra note 79, at 90–95. 
 162 Id. at 95–99. 
 163 Id. at 57. 
 164 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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breach of the very licensing agreement that includes inequitable 
clauses.  However even in those cases, the two steps, abuse of 
rights and subsequent bar to enforcement, remain separate.  In the 
case of a strategic use of copyright, however, there is only one 
event—the enforcement of rights, which should act as a bar to 
itself.  Support for this reasoning can be found in the “abuse of 
process” variant of copyright misuse, in which inequitable conduct 
and copyright enforcement constitute a single act.165 
A substantive problem with the application of copyright misuse 
is that it would require an extension of existing case law.  Courts 
have so far considered application of copyright misuse to protect 
competition, free speech, and the judicial process.  All of those 
policies act as external boundaries to the property rights of a 
copyright owner, and as such, they would be equally applicable to 
other intellectual property rights.  Some strategic uses of copyright 
protection may also include external considerations—for example, 
technological lock-out could have anticompetitive dimensions.166  
However, a general extension of the misuse defense to strategic 
uses of copyright protection would require the recognition of 
boundaries that are internal to copyright law.  For example, use of 
copyright law to implement a brand lock-out strategy is not likely 
to threaten competition, because others are free to develop their 
own franchises; it cannot harm free speech more than ordinary 
copyright enforcement, because copyright law already includes 
“built-in First Amendment accommodations” in the form of the 
fair use doctrine and the idea/expression distinction;167 and finally 
it cannot involve an abuse of process, because the copyright owner 
seeks to enforce her exclusive adaptation rights which are 
expressly granted by the copyright statute.168  Raising a misuse 
defense against a brand lock-out copyright infringement suit would 
 
 165 Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 647. 
 166 See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(applying the copyright misuse doctrine to a software license prohibiting the licensee 
from using the software only in conjunction with the licensor’s hardware). 
 167 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003); see also Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining to apply the 
misuse defense where fair use protects free speech rights). 
 168 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (“the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to . . . prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
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require arguing that the plaintiff is exceeding the proper scope of 
copyright, not that she is bumping against some other overarching 
policy.  While this would represent a significant departure from 
existing precedent, it must be remembered that the doctrine of 
copyright misuse is less than twenty years old and “far from well-
established.”169 
Overall, the legal and equitable arguments against strategic 
uses of copyright protection are likely to stand or fall together.  
The historical purpose of equitable jurisdiction was to grant ad-hoc 
relief in exceptional cases, when strict application of the common 
law would have resulted in an injustice.170  However, a copyright 
misuse defense is available only to the extent that a copyright 
owner exceeds the internal boundaries of the statutory grant.  This 
is determined by the same subject-matter-specific considerations 
that drive the interpretation and application of the copyright 
statute, and not by independent, generally applicable equitable 
criteria.  In other words, legal principles are injected into equitable 
decision-making.171  In this respect, copyright misuse is merely an 
equitable vehicle for enforcing, or rather “reinforcing,” legal 
doctrines.172 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that lock-out and hold-up strategies are really 
two sides of the same coin, i.e., the use of copyright law to protect 
not a work as such, but an underlying economic investment.  This 
Note also reviewed some reasons why such strategies may be 
inappropriate under the traditional copyright paradigm.  None of 
 
 169 Frischmann & Moylan, Software Copyright Misuse, supra note 153, at 869. 
 170 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918 (1987). 
 171 Cf. Kelly D. Hine, Comment, The Rule of Law is Dead, Long Live the Rule: An 
Essay on Legal Rules, Equitable Standards, and the Debate Over Judicial Discretion, 50 
SMU L. REV. 1769, 1778–79, 1785–86 (1997) (criticizing the reverse injection of 
principles of equity into legal decision-making, which destroys the distinction between 
the rule of law and the equitable discretion to grant exceptions to that rule). 
 172 See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 153, at 10, 23 (arguing that courts apply 
copyright misuse to “reinforce” existing scope and subject matter limitations, such as the 
idea-expression doctrine). 
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these arguments is airtight, and an advocate of the current system 
can always justify the status quo in view of established precedent 
and long-standing custom of the media industry.  However, 
regardless of the doctrinal subtleties, one should at a minimum be 
able to make a case for restoring transparency to the political 
process.  Whenever a major revision of the federal copyright 
statute is considered, Congress holds extensive policy debates, 
including testimony by high-profile law professors, artists, and 
media executives.173  Underlying these debates is the “official 
story” of copyright protection as a mechanism to promote 
creativity, or to reward deserving authors, and not as a tool for 
implementing business strategies.174  For example, we noted above 
that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, tellingly 
nicknamed the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act,”175 had the effect 
of extending some of Disney’s most valuable strategic copyrights.  
However the main policy documents recording the debate, 
including the dissenters’ views, never mention such effect.176  One 
may argue that strategic uses are tacitly taken into account during 
those debates—after all, industry lobbyists must be working in 
close cooperation with their legal departments.  However, one 
wonders to what extent pursuing a “hidden agenda” serves the 
goals of democracy.  Openness would not necessarily work against 
the proponents of strong copyright protection.  In fact, given 
Congress’s readiness to accept whatever arguments are put forward 
by special interest groups,177 pointing out the strategic role of 
certain copyrights might even favor stronger rights.  For example, 
 
 173 See Sterk, supra note 135, at 1198–1202. 
 174 See id. at 1244–46 (describing the discrepancy between the public-interest rhetoric 
advanced in support of legislation and the reality that such legislation is the result of 
direct negotiations between special interest groups at the expense of the public). 
 175 Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065 
(2001). 
 176 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104–315 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 105–542 (1998); Dennis S. 
Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition 
to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505 “The Copyright Term Extension Act” (Jan. 28, 1998), 
available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/ 
legmats/1998statement.html. 
 177 See, e.g., William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting 
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 923–32 (1996) (showing the weakness of 
each of the arguments supporting the Copyright Term Extension Act, which Congress 
eventually enacted). 
PACELLI_042808_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:32:02 PM 
1270 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
a long copyright term could be defended on the ground that it is 
functional to the branding strategies of major corporations, rather 
than being simply a windfall or welfare grant to the heirs or 
assignees of long-dead authors.178  Most importantly, to openly 
acknowledge the fact that strategic uses of copyright protection are 
an important part of many modern business models would go a 
long way toward achieving that “delicate balance” that many 
acknowledge is not achieved by today’s intellectual property 
laws.179 
 
 178 See, e.g., id. at 928, 932–33; Karjala, supra note 176, at 25. 
 179 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory 
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 780–87 (2001); 
Patry, supra note 177, at 907–10. 
